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Abstract 
MANET is accessible to legitimate as well as non- legitimate network users. Secured routing over such 
kind of network is a very critical task due to highly dynamic environment.  In this research paper, a new 
intrusion detection protocol has been proposed for secured routing over MANET. An experimental analysis 
of proposed protocol has been carried using network simulator. Based on the experimental analysis, 
recommendations have been made about the significance of protocol under various situations.      
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1. Introduction 
MANET can be viewed as collection of wireless mobile nodes that forms a short-lived network without any 
fixed infrastructure. In this network, all the nodes configure themselves and are free to move about 
arbitrarily. The dilemma is that how should it be judged whether the MANET is secure or not. Some of the 
security attributes (Stallings 2011) that are used to inspect the security state of MANET are availability, 
integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, authorization and non-repudiation etc. The main threats that violate 
these security criteria’s are generally called as attacks (Stallings 2011) which are divided into two 
categories: passive vs. active attacks. These attacks are labeled as traffic analysis, eavesdropping, 
masquerading, message modification, replay and denial-of-service. The prominent characteristics of adhoc 
networks create challenges in developing complete security solutions. In this paper, efforts are to develop a 
complete security solution for MANET that has mechanisms for prevention, detection and healing of 
attacks.  
 
2. Related Work 
B. Dahill et al. proposed an on-demand routing protocol ARAN (Dahill et al. 2001) for adhoc networking 
environment that uses certificates to ensure authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of routing 
messages. This protocol uses public key cryptography to overwhelm the attacks and ensures secured 
routing for the managed-open and open adhoc networking environments. A secured routing protocol, SRP, 
was proposed by P. Papadimitratos and Z. J. Haas (Papadimitratos et al. 2002). It ensures secured 
communication in the open, collaborative and highly dynamic adhoc networking environment. SRP 
respond to malicious behavior in a timely manner and ensures comprehensive secure communication. 
ARIADNE (Perrig et al. 2002) prevents a wide range of attacks to ensure secures routing in an adhoc 
networking environment. This protocol uses highly efficient symmetric cryptography that makes it more 
proficient, which in turn prohibits attackers from tampering with uncompromised routes. The problem with 
this protocol is that it does not safeguard against passive attackers. L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas (Zhou et al. 
1999) have used effective key management to ensure secured routing over adhoc networking environment. 
 S. Marti et al. have used misbehavior detection schemes (Marti et al. 2000) to secure adhoc 
networks. The problem with this scheme is that it does no guarantee to have two main security parameters 
viz. integrity and authentication of routing messages. D. B. Johnson et al. (Johnson et al. 2002) proposed to 
use symmetric cryptography for secured routing over adhoc networking environment and it can be 
implemented using one way hash chains. Manel Guerrero Zapata, N. Asokan (Zapata et al. 2002) proposed 
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a secured routing protocol that makes use of asymmetric cryptography to authenticate participating nodes 
and uses one way hash chains to ensure secured routing over adhoc environment.    
 
3. Proposed Secured Routing Protocol 
Efforts have been done to propose a new secured routing protocol for adhoc networking environment. The 
new protocol has been developed by using the mechanism of hash key chains. Cryptographic hashing 
(Partow 2007) is used for data/user verification and authentication. The popular examples of hashing 
functions (Arun 2010) are HMAC, SHA-1 and MD5. The proposed solution ensures safe and secured 
communication over adhoc environment by applying hashing techniques in different stages of routing. 
The hash key chain has been implemented by using a recursive chain (Lamport 1981). First, a random key 
RK1 is selected and then the subsequent keys (Kush 2009) are calculated by using the technique of one way 
hashing as under:     
RK2 = H [RK1] 




RKN = [RKN-1]               
A node authenticates any received value on the hash key chain using above-mentioned keys. The received 
key will be authentic if the computed value is same as that of previously identified authentic key value. 
Each node over adhoc networking environment discloses the keys in a particular order and the disclosure 
order is exactly opposite of the keys generation order. Efforts have also been carried out to evaluate the 
performance of proposed protocol by using a number of quantitative performance metrics. 
 
4. Performance Metrics 
RFC 2501 illustrate a number of quantitative metrics that can be used to analyze the performance of 
MANET routing protocols. Metrics that have been used to analyze the performance of proposed on-demand 
routing protocol are packet delivery fraction,  average end to end delay, network throughput and 
normalized routing load. 
 
4.1 Packet Delivery Fraction 
The packet delivery fraction is defined as the ratio of number of data packets received at the destinations 
over the number of data packets sent by the sources.  
Packet Delivery Fraction = 
Sent Packets Data Total
Received Packets Data Total
 X 100 
 
4.2 Average End-to-End Delay 
This is the average time involved in delivery of data packets from the source node to the destination node. 
To compute the average end-to-end delay, add every delay for each successful data packet delivery and 
divide that sum by the number of successfully received data packets.  
Average End to End Delay = 
Received Packets Data Total
Sent) Time - Received (Time∑
  
 
4.3 Network Throughput  
A network throughput is the average rate at which message is successfully delivered between a destination 
node (receiver) and source node (sender). It is also referred to as the ratio of the amount of data received 
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from its sender to the time the last packet reaches its destination. Throughput can be measured as bits per 
second (bps), packets per second or packet per time slot. For a network, it is required that the throughput is 
at high-level. Some factors that affect MANET’s throughput are unreliable communication, changes in 
topology, limited energy and bandwidth. 
 
4.4 Normalized Routing Load 
The normalized routing load is defined as the fraction of all routing control packets sent by all nodes over 
the number of received data packets at the destination nodes. In other words, it is the ratio between the total 
numbers of routing packets sent over the network to the total number of data packets received.  
Normalized Routing Load = 
Received Packets Data Total
Sent Packets Routing Total
 
 
5. Analysis using Performance Metrics 
The mobility model used is random waypoint model. An extensive simulation model having scenario of 25 
and 85 mobile nodes is used to study inter-layer interactions. Same scenario has been used for performance 
evaluation of both proposed secured routing protocol and AODV protocol. The packet size is 512 bytes. 
The square area considered for 25 nodes is 750 meter x 750 meter and 1500 meter x 1500 meter for 85 
nodes. The simulation run time for 25 nodes is 500 seconds and 900 seconds for 85 nodes. 
 
5.1 Simulation Results for 25 Nodes having 8 UDP Connections 
The pause time has been used as a varying parameter from 100 seconds to 500 seconds and the queue 
length is 150. The speed for node’s movement has been fixed at 5 meters/second. Two malicious nodes 
have been introduced in the network scenarios which are moving at a speed of one meter per second. Figure 
1 shows packet delivery fraction with respect to pause time. The observation is that proposed secured 
routing protocol gives high packet delivery fraction that AODV. In figure 2, the relationship between 
average end to end delay and pause time has been depicted. The AODV protocol has high average end to 
end delay than proposed protocol when the pause time is between 100 to 150 seconds but after that AODV 
and proposed protocol gives almost same results. On an average, proposed protocol outperforms AODV.  
The network throughput with respect to pause time has been shown in figure 3. In this figure, proposed 
protocol gives high throughput than AODV. Therefore, we can say that proposed protocol outperforms 
AODV in terms of throughput. Figure 4 shows normalized routing load by varying pause time. The bigger 
this fraction is the less efficient the routing protocol. When the pause time is between 100 seconds to 300 
seconds, AODV shows bigger normalized routing load than proposed protocol but after that both proposed 
protocol and AODV gives almost same results. On an average, proposed protocol outperforms AODV in 
terms of normalized routing load. 
 
5.2 Simulation Results for 85 Nodes having 16 UDP Connections  
The pause time is varying from 100 seconds to 900 seconds and the queue length is same as before. The 
speed for node’s movement has been fixed at 10 meters/second. Two malicious nodes have been introduced 
in the network scenarios which are moving at a speed of 5 meters/second. Figure 5 shows that packet 
delivery fraction for proposed secured routing protocol is much higher than that of AODV protocol for all 
pause times and hence proposed secure routing protocol gives better packet delivery than that of AODV 
protocol. In figure 6, average end to end delay has been presented with respect to pause time. When the 
pause time is between 100 seconds to 700 seconds, AODV protocol has elevated average end to end delay 
than that of proposed protocol but when it is between 700 seconds to 900 seconds, proposed secured 
routing protocol gives high average end to end delay than AODV. 
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Figure 2. Average End to End Delay 
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Figure 3. Network Throughput 
 
Figure 4. Normalized Routing Load 
Concluding, we can say that initially proposed secured routing protocol outperforms AODV but in end 
AODV starts outperforming proposed secured routing protocol. This issue is still under consideration. 
Network throughput with respect to pause time has been shown in figure 7. Proposed secured routing 
protocol gives high throughput than AODV for all pause times and hence proposed secured routing protocol 
outperforms AODV in terms of better throughput. Figure 8 shows normalized routing load by varying 
pause time. The bigger this fraction is the less efficient the routing protocol. When the pause time is 
between 100 seconds to 300 seconds, Proposed secured routing protocol shows bigger normalized routing 
load than AODV; when it is between 300 seconds to 400 seconds, AODV shows bigger normalized routing 
load than proposed secured routing protocol and when pause time is between 400 seconds to 900 seconds, 
Proposed secured routing protocol shows marginal bigger normalized routing load than AODV. Although 
both the protocols give almost same results but still due to marginal difference between the results, we can 
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say that on an average AODV outperforms proposed secured routing protocol.  
 
 
Figure 5. Packet Delivery Fraction 
 
Figure 6. Average End to End Delay 
 
Network and Complex Systems  www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-610X (Paper)  ISSN 2225-0603 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.2, 2012 
28 
 
Figure 7. Network Throughput 
 
Figure 8. Normalized Routing Load 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Scope 
The existing MANET routing protocols normally follows the attack oriented design and implementation. 
Firstly, the various attacks on security are identified and then the existing protocol is enhanced to overcome 
the identified attacks. Since the protocol is enhanced by keeping in view the certain attacks, it may not 
handle the unexpected attacks on network security rather it provides secured routing in the presence of 
identified attacks only. Therefore, efforts have been done to propose a multifold and complete security 
solution for adhoc networking environment by developing a new on-demand secured routing protocol. The 
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proposed intrusion detection protocol tackles known and un-known security threats in a highly efficient 
manner by offering offers multiple lines of defense. The performance of proposed protocol has been 
evaluated with respect to AODV protocol using four primary quantitative metrics i.e. packet delivery 
fraction, average end to end delay, network throughput and normalized routing load. It has been concluded 
that when the malicious nodes come into the way over the adhoc networking environment, AODV protocol 
fails to handle the security threats but the proposed protocol conquer against the malicious attacks in a 
highly efficient manner. Efforts are in progress to increase the number of mobile nodes in the simulated 
model of adhoc networking environment and then to introduce more and more malicious nodes. Its impact 
on the performance of adhoc network needs to be determined by generating the appropriate network 
scenarios using network simulator. Efforts can also be done to enhance the hash functions and then to 
generate strong hash keys using some supplementary credential primitives like IP address, username, 
password and biometric etc. 
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